This blog is written by Sidhartha Das, a seasoned Advocate, specialised in Intellectual Property Law and Senior Partner at Auromaa Associates. With extensive experience in Trademarks, Patents, Copyrights and Industrial Designs, he has represented clients in high-stakes cases before the Supreme Court of India and IP forums. His work blends legal expertise with business acumen to deliver strategic, precedent-setting solutions.     

Introduction

A lot of headlines have been made in recent days about the registration of a trademark application of the name Operation Sindoor, which has raised concerns about the registration of a trademark for the same name. The fact that the operation itself was a great initiative of the armed forces of our country, but it was also an opportunity to be witnessed by some people. And you will be amazed to know that there were about 23 applications made to obtain a trademark on the name and commercially use it, in India, the USA and the UK.  

Where others saw it as a business opportunity and lacked sensitivity, others claimed that this would water down the value and the purpose of the operation. It has now become a big legal and moral question, and there is a lot of opposition from the general populace and legal observers.

This posed a question whether any government or military activity is permitted to have a treatment as any other name with regard to trademarks? 

In order to comprehend and analyse this in a more efficient manner, we are going to break down the legal part of this, and we will know about additional guidelines that can assist us in examining whether a national military operation can be turned into a commercial brand.

What is a Trademark? Meaning and scope 

To comprehend the legal boundary of this concept in India, our discussion should start with understanding ‘Trademark’.

Section 2 (1) (zb) of the  Trademarks Act, 1999 defines a ‘Trademark’ as a sign that can be expressed graphically and is able to differentiate the goods or services of an individual over those of other people and may also include the shape of goods, their packaging and combination of colour. The logos, symbols or names that we see on any product or service tend to represent this idea. 

Nevertheless, the commercial connotation in it is much deeper. A trademark is a personification of the company in the market. Each trademark contributes a lot more than any tangible asset to the financial worth of a business. As such, it needs an equivalent degree of protection, and this protection is achieved by the rights of a trademark. 

When it comes to anything like an idea, a product or a war, there is always a name to be given to it, and there is always a race to win the name. When one possesses such a name then that person gains a competitive advantage over it. A trademark facilitates the prevention of the use of a similar name by others,  which may mislead people. For instance, you cannot use a brand name like Adidas, the half-eaten Apple logo, or the brand image like the Amul Girl because it belongs to another business. 

In case an individual makes an attempt, the actual owner may initiate an infringement case under Section 28  of the Trademarks Act, 1999. This is even more sensitive in cases where the name has national or emotional attachment, such as the name of a government operation.

What can be identified as ‘Government Operation’?

The actions, which are taken by the government and, in fact, by the military, are often referred to as the ‘Government Operations’, and are considered as the ones that are important. The names may have missions that bear names of the code, peacekeeping assignments or rescuing ones. The names of Operation Khukri, Operation Sindoor, Operation Meghdoot and Operation Bluestar are all such operations that are very important with reference to national importance. 

India lacks a strict legal framework that can prevent any person from trademarking the name of a government operation. However, in case the Defence Ministry is interested in registering any such name, then it can forbid other individuals from obtaining a trademark on such names.

So, the question that arises is, why are such trademark applications rejected? The response to this is that the usage of the name of any government operation by one individual can easily deceive people, and they may begin to believe that such an individual with the trademark may have some official support or even government backing. They may as well hurt religious or public feelings, in many cases. These are the reasons that are stated in Section 9 of the Trademarks Act, 1999, that grant the government the right to deny such registrations.

Whenever a company records any trademark that is also profound nationally, the likelihood is that it might gain an unfair advantage or profits in the marketplace. In the majority of cases, individuals have a rather natural tendency toward the names that once had some emotional content and above all, when they are linked with some government activities or any other events within the country. Thus, when these names are registered as a trademark, it do not only get the brand name but also identify and acquire the sentiments and trust of the masses. 

Operation Khukri vs. Operation Sindoor 

If we look at the very few precedents that are available on this concept, we come across the trademark registration of ‘Operation Khukri’ by Abundantia Entertainment Private Limited. 

The question here arises that in case of a Government Operation name that has already been registered as a trademark, then why is the same being criticised under a new and recent occurrence? It is also striking to note that despite falling under the same class, i.e Class 41 of the Nice Classification System dealing with services related to media, entertainment, education, culture, etc., we see different outcomes in the two cases. 

The potential responses to these questions are moving around the factual situation of the cases in terms of their magnitude, timing, social reaction and legal strategies. Operation Khukri was one of the major military activities conducted by the Indian forces in a UN Peacekeeping Mission. The contrast is that it was not a situation of moment trademarking as a display of opportunism since it was registered 23 years later than the mission, and that too by only one applicant. On the contrary, the trademark application of Operation Sindoor, which is a government operation, has merely proved to be a time of self-interested business fulfilment. In the current conflict between the two countries, many persons indicated their interest in trademarking it immediately, whereas in the Operation Khukri, the case was not similar. 

Operation Sindoor trademarking can be interpreted as the act of desperate commercialisation of an operation that has national sentiments. On the other hand, decades-old Operation Khukri is associated with an entire UN operation and war valour, whereas Operation Sindoor is a symbolic and cultural story. Operation Khukri may be recalled as military heritage, and Operation Sindoor is associated with national mourning..

What are the limitations on trademarking the name of Government Operations?

To determine the legal requirement to file the trademark registration of a Government Operation name, we must consider the varying grounds of rejection of a trademark registration application.

Trademarks Act, 1999

There are two grounds of rejection under the Trademarks Act, 1999, which are absolute and relative.  The absolute grounds are associated with the lack of such attributes which are inherent in the trademark as such, and the lack of which causes the application for registration to be stopped. There is a lack of uniqueness, having a mark that defines its value (be it geographic, qualitative, quantitative, etc.) in any manner, using common language words or tarnished as being against any law or concepts of morality. Furthermore, the Act u/S 9(2)(d) prohibits the registration of any trademark that may lead to any confusion amongst the public, deception of the public or is prohibited under the Emblems and Names (Prevention of Improper Use) Act,1950.

For example, words like sweet, laptop and rasoi cannot be used as trademarks because they indicate the nature of the product, as held in the case of M/s Hindustan Development Corporation Ltd. v. The Deputy Registrar of Trademarks [AIR 1955 Cal. 519]. Such absolute grounds of disqualification are to be found in Section 9 of the Trademarks Act, 1999. This is to avoid fraudulent activities that might mislead the general populace by causing them confusion about a certain product.

Trademark Co-existence and Implications for a Government Operation Name 

The relative grounds of refusal are supposed to consider the trademark with those ones that are in existence. This means that a trademark may be rejected when it is protected under the Copyright Law, or it has already got a large consumer base, either in the number of customers it has or through its channels of distribution or when it has been protected under any other law. 

Let’s see the case of Nandhini Deluxe v. Karnatak Co-Operative Milk Producers Federation Limited (AIR 2018 SC 3516). This was a mark infringement case on the registration of the names Nandhini and Nandini. The Apex Court ruled that co-existence of both marks may be permitted even in the face of similarities. 

Alright, but can any other party come and make a slight alteration to the names of Government Operations and have the trademark registered? 

We must see the background of the above judgment. The goods in question were associated with restaurant services and dairy products, and the parties had no common goods since the nature of the goods provided by them was different, and the co-existence was approved. But the case of a Government Operation name is not the same. In case the changes, which have been done in the name of the operation, are of such a nature that it is impossible to draw an inter-relation between the same very easily, then there is a possibility of co-existence. Also, it would depend on the purpose of using such a name, but the existing law might not be able to justify it in the scenario of living alongside such a trademark that has the emotional load of a national tragedy, which can elicit thousands of feelings in people.

Well, what if a trademark is being used not to make a profit? Then we would normally assume that it can be granted as a trademark because there is no intention to make a profit out of it. This question was settled in Tata Sons Limited v. Greenpeace International & Anr, I.A. NO. 9089/2010 in CS (OS). Here, Greenpeace was an NGO that took the logo and trademark of TATA and argued that it was a fair comment, followed by criticism through a parody of the logo and trademark. The aim was to raise awareness for non-commercial use.

They claimed that it would come under freedom of speech and expression and denied the allegations of TATA that it infringed their registered trademark u/S 29(4) of the Act. In this case, the injunction was denied, regarding some of the main arguments, such as the fact that the work of parody might be distinguished from the original one, and it was unlikely to cause confusion between customers. 

But when we are discussing the trademarking of a government operation, then it is possible that it might not pass the distinctiveness test u/S 9 of the Act. When the changes effected in the name of the operation are of such a character that it could not be easily supposed that there was any inter-relation between the same, then co-existence may be admitted. 

Public Sentiment and Religious Considerations in Trademark Registration

Other than the above reasons, which evaluate the trademarks on technical grounds, we have to also consider the wider societal and religious reasons why the names of government operations are not registered. It is important to know how the trademarking of the word Operation Sindoor can offend the religious sentiments of individuals. 

This operation is the outcome of the recent misfortune of tourists in Pahalgam. It gets its name from a sense of unity and nationality among the people of India. In India, the word Sindoor has a religious connotation as well. Thus, it is possible to say that the commercial benefits of such usage of a name may damage the overall mood of the population.

State, Sentiment and Section 9

The Trademark Act, u/S 9(2)(b), does not allow registration of any trademark that may offend religious susceptibilities. Some people can also see in this as trying to commercialise national tragedy and collective mourning in order to make money. In May 2025, there was a PIL before the Supreme Court on similar grounds. The petition emphasised the feelings of citizens and the sacrifices behind this operation.

Reliance Industries was also on the list of people running after the trademark of Operation Sindoor a few days before the aforementioned PIL. However, shortly after they were met with a Public backlash, they pulled their application back and published a statement, which attributed it to a mistake made by a junior employee. 

The foundation of PIL is in Section 9, which is mainly concerned with the absolute grounds of refusal to register a trademark. In addition to that, in India, there exists a facilitatory organisation called the ‘Trademark Registry’ that governs the rules and regulations regarding trademark registration in India. When it comes to the application, in case the Registry feels the necessity to ask any query regarding the application, it may also call the applicants to and fro. 

The registry would also highlight Section 9(2)(b) in the application of a case such as Operation Sindoor to establish that the application is damaging the religious feelings of the people of India. In case there is space for the same, then it might be rejected by the registry after verification, as long as the concerns are not addressed. The grounds of refusal would be difficult because it is frequently influenced by the current state of affairs at the time of filing.

Preventing False Government Affiliation in Trademark Registration

No name capable of bearing the relevance or bearing of the Government of India or bearing a relevance to that of a state government can be registered as a trademark as stipulated in Section 3 Clause 7 Emblems and Names (Prohibition of Improper Use) Act, 1950. It may also be stated that in case of any government operation, any attempt by any private company to or wanting to register any name as trademark then the registration of the trademark is denied on the basis that it may give a false impression to the people that it may be a government supported or approved trademark. 

The other major basis of denying trademark registration is when the mark suggests that it is linked to the national defence; in that case, the registry will reject it. This is not an expressly given ground, but can be an implied ground of rejection. In case a company or a business begins to use a Government Operation name, there is a possibility that the general population may come to believe that the products or services being marketed are in some way associated with or a part of the national defence of India. 

Accordingly, rejection of a trademark registration of the name of a government operation is exhaustive as per both legal and public interest.

Balancing national significance and private trademark claims

People have profit-making interests, and hence the whole talk about the trademark of Government Operation names. The fame of the operation rendered its name tempting to economic interests. Nevertheless, due to the sheer amount of condemnation and the fact that the applicants were not able to demonstrate that they wanted to use the specific Operation Sindoor as a trademark, the applications were turned down. 

That is not the real issue to be decided, as the position of the law is uncertain on two aspects: 

• First, whether the government can trademark the names and 
• Second, whether there should be permission given to the private parties to trademark the name of a government operation. 

Preferably, rights to a Government Operation name should be vested in the Government, as is the case with Emblems, Flag, etc. No privately owned entity should be permitted to trademark such a name of national significance unless a considerable lapse of time has taken place and the trademark applicant can demonstrate that it has a good faith intent of use.

Conclusion

The whole discussion that we carried out provided us with the outcome that no strict laws exist that can be applied to trademark the name of government operations. India must do something to control these things and may prevent the people from using the incidents of national concern. The recent incident of trademarking the name of Operation Sindoor is an instance of moment trademark, and that too with a motive to trademark on a very significant moment in the history of India. 

It is not a new piece of news; in the era of COVID-19, several companies have developed an interest and filed trademarks on the term COVID-19. These situations provide impetus to the development of a solid legal framework and to prevent the distortion of the name, which is associated with the memory of the population.  A regulatory body would assist in defining the boundary between respect and commercial profit.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) 

1. Is the trademarking of the unclaimed names, like Government Operations is granted based on ‘first come, first served’?

No, it is not given on a first-come, first-served basis. It perceives the mood of the people, their unique nature, as well as the probability of misleading the minds of the people. Hence, the earliest filer on a trademark registration is not automatically approved.

2. Are Military Operation names the Intellectual Property of the Government?

This question has an answer which rests on the fact, i.e. whether it has been registered as a trademark by the government. When the answer is yes, then it turns out to be an intellectual property of the Government. Yet, trademarking of names of military actions is not a common government move. In this case, the names of the military operation are not automatically covered by the intellectual property law just because they were state projects. Hence, the doors are left open to allow the attempts of the private parties to trademark the names.

3. What does ‘Moment Trademarking’ mean, and how is this related to ‘Operation Sindoor’?

Moment Trademarking refers to the process of applying the trademark to the marks, names and symbols that are linked with the events of public interest that are prevailing at that particular time. The most iconic example of moment trademarking is the trademark race of the matter concerning Operation Sindoor. It was considered an ideal occasion to acquire exclusive rights to the name that has a buzz around it.

References 

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This blog is written by Punit Gaur, a seasoned litigation and arbitration lawyer with over six years of experience handling complex commercial disputes. With a distinctive academic foundation in both B.Tech and LLB, he offers a balanced blend of technical acumen and legal insight, bringing a practical and strategic perspective to complex legal challenges. 

Introduction

Over modern India-UK economic relations, the shadow of the colonial past is huge. British colonial control methodically took riches from India for almost two centuries, transforming a thriving economy into a provider of raw materials and a captive market for British goods. From a Third World or postcolonial standpoint, especially, this heritage of exploitation embodied in laws like the Charter Act of 1813 and the drain of wealth thesis espoused by Dadabhai Naoroji continues to shape how trade agreements between the two countries are seen.

Both India and the United Kingdom highlight 2024–25 as they discuss the outlines of a long-awaited Free Trade Agreement (FTA) as a sign of mutual prosperity and a new age of cooperation. While India expects more access for its textiles, IT services, and agricultural exports, the UK forecasts the pact will increase its GDP by £4.8 billion yearly. Underneath these hopeful forecasts, however, critical voices caution that the FTA might just reinterpret old systems under a neoliberal cover. Along with divisive topics like the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the UK’s need for further access to Indian markets for cars, spirits, and financial services begs questions about asymmetric gains and the continuation of structural inequality.

From a Third World standpoint, the India-UK Free Economic Agreement (FTA) increasingly resembles a skillfully veiled continuation of neocolonial economic dynamics where the Global North reaps more than it sows, even while it is touted as a doorway to mutual prosperity.

Historical background: Second Innings in colonisation

Colonial-era economic trends that methodically destroyed India’s self-sufficiency still haunt the trade relationship between India and the UK. Policies like the Charter Act of 1813 opened Indian markets to duty-free British textiles under British rule (1757–1947), charging expensive taxes (up to 80%) on Indian exports in Europe. 

By means of this intentional deindustrialisation, India’s vibrant handicraft industry fell from 24.4% in 1750 to 2.4% by 1900, hence lowering its part of world manufacturing. Pushed into congested farming, artists were enmeshed in rural poverty and dependent on exports of raw materials. Concurrently, thirty to forty per cent of national income was syphoned overseas yearly, while the drain of wealth theory quantified colonial extraction: India’s profits fueled British wars, pensions for colonial officials, and industrial progress in Britain.

Structural adjustment programs and neoliberal reforms carried on this disparity post-independence. While Global North economies kept subsidies and non-tariff barriers, Global South countries such as India were under pressure to open markets. Dependency theory helps to understand this dynamic: former colonies remain “peripheries”, providing cheap labour or resources to the “core,” therefore monopolising high-value output. 

Modern FTAs typically mirror this hierarchy: 85% of UK goods entering India will eventually be duty-free, therefore risking market flooding similar to that of 19th-century textile imports. Concurrent with this, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) of the United Kingdom threatens to tax $2.75 billion of Indian exports by 2027, therefore reflecting colonial extractions under fresh environmental pretexts.

This begs a basic question: Can “fair trade” between former colonisers and colonised under a global order still favour Northern capital? If we go deeper, the “fair trade” between former colonists and colonised countries is deeply damaged after a global order favouring the northern capital. Despite the language of equality and mutual use, structural imbalances rooted in colonial narratives are made up of modern trading systems. 

Global institutions such as the WTO, IMF, and the World Bank often reflect the interests of developed countries, trade rules, intellectual property regimes, and regimes in ways that benefit transnational corporations and the northern economies. The old colonies, still relying on exporting raw materials and importing finished goods, are surrounded by unequal exchange conditions. This economic asymmetry, combined with limited negotiation power and sustained debt dependence, means that fair trade often acts as a more rhetorical ideal than a concrete reality in the Northern relationship.

India’s exclusion of delicate industries (diamonds, cellphones) from tariff reduction exposes defensive negotiating, but fundamental inequalities endure. The silence of the FTA on technology transfers or reparative investments points to continuity with colonial extractivism rather than rupture. The spectre of neocolonialism will linger until trade systems redress past abuses and fairly disperse value linkages.

Who has the advantage of the neoliberal trade framework?

Often touted as a road to world prosperity is the neoliberal trade framework, as institutionalised by the WTO and repeated in bilateral FTAs, such as the India-UK pact. From a Third World or postcolonial point of view, however, these systems methodically replicate the very dependence they assert will be eliminated. Global North writes the game’s rules; Global South is left to negotiate a landscape turned against its best interests.

The Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism runs at the core of these treaties. Bypassing domestic legal systems, ISD lets foreign investors sue sovereign nations before international tribunals. Apart from being opaque and expensive, this approach compromises host countries’ regulatory sovereignty, which is usually unacceptable for developing countries. 

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) claims that, with major financial and policy repercussions, over 70% of ISDS litigation is started by investors from rich nations against governments in the Global South. Governments fear expensive litigation and erratic arbitral rulings, so there is a well-recorded chilling effect on public interest regulation, environmental, labour, or public health.

Provisions on intellectual property and digital trade reinforce Northern dominance even more. Though India opposes the UK’s demand for more IP rights in the FTA, this reflects a larger trend: protecting pharmaceutical and technological monopolies under the cover of “innovation.” India’s generic medication market is still under protection for now, but digital trade chapters covering data transfers, source code, and cross-border services are frequently designed to benefit Western economies with established IT giants. This limits the policy space available to developing nations to foster their digital ecosystems or implement required data localisation rules.

Another feature of contemporary FTAs is regulatory harmonisation, which is sometimes a kind of economic coercion. It forces developing nations, independent of local context or developmental aspirations, to match domestic standards on commodities, services, and even environmental measures with those of the Global North. This alignment is not neutral; it locks out local innovation and favours the interests and capabilities of advanced economies, hence increasing compliance costs for home manufacturers.

Under the cover of liberalisation, FTAs such as the India-UK deal encourage reliance and asymmetry rather than a level playing field.

Variations in Bargaining Power

Though the UK’s post-Brexit need for new trade partners and India’s demographic and economic growth seem to be in line, the India-UK FTA negotiations expose ongoing disparities in negotiating leverage. Faced with reduced influence and market access following Brexit, the UK actively sought this agreement to safeguard its economic interests and world significance. Conversely, India used its position as the fastest-growing major economy in the world and its large market to negotiate concessions, including the exclusion of important sectors diamonds, smartphones, plastics, and some vehicles, from tariff reductions, and phasing in duty cuts to safeguard the home industry.

Still, under the surface, it is obvious who finally defines the terms: global capital and elite technocrats. Led by high-level bureaucrats from the trade ministry, the Indian negotiation team was commended for its strategic sense and ability to protect key sectors. But the process was mostly free from the direct involvement of those most impacted, labour unions, small farmers, and MSMEs, whose voices remain peripheral in high-stakes trade politics. Although the FTA is expected to help Indian professionals and increase bilateral trade to $120 billion by 2030, worries remain that the advantages will be disproportionately shared, favouring big businesses and export-oriented sectors over the larger base of India’s labour.

The language of strategic cooperation and mutual benefit hides the reality that discussions take place under a global economic system in which money speaks louder than democratic representation. Designed in elite venues, regulatory frameworks, tariff schedules, and market access clauses often reflect the goals of multinational investors and export lobbyists rather than those of average workers or small companies. Therefore, even with India’s increasing leverage, the structure and content of the FTA nevertheless show the ongoing impact of capital and technocratic knowledge over inclusive, democratic trade policies.

Effect on indigenous people and Indian farmers: a strike in the backbone

Particularly for Indian farmers, workers, and indigenous businesses, the home impact of the India-UK FTA is likely to be somewhat unequal. Strong resistance from farmers’ unions has been expressed, saying that lowered tariffs on British agricultural and processed food imports could lead to an inflow of cheaper, usually subsidised goods, therefore undercutting local producers and jeopardising India’s food sovereignty. 

The government has banned some sensitive goods, including dairy, apples, and cheese, from concessions, but more general liberalisation runs the danger of exposing Indian agriculture to erratic foreign prices and weakening the support system of subsidies and minimum support prices that underlie rural life. This is consistent with the justification for India’s RCEP pullout, where comparable worries about agricultural vulnerability and lack of policy scope drove a last-minute departure.

Another problem is the FTA’s liberalising rules for services. The UK’s drive for more access in telecom, financial, and digital services could put pressure on India to loosen data localisation rules and privacy standards, compromising home data protection systems and exposing gig workers to unstable employment standards moulded by foreign tech giants. Without strong legislative protections, such liberalisation runs the danger of erasing digital sovereignty and exacerbating the precarity of India’s growing gig economy.

The competitive scene would get more hostile for Indian MSMEs. The FTA opens Indian markets to UK goods that benefit from superior technology, regulatory capital, and strict product standards, areas where tiny Indian businesses struggle to compete. Faster customs processing, lower technical obstacles, and mutual recognition of standards will benefit UK exporters; Indian SMEs may be excluded from the UK market should they be unable to satisfy demanding certification requirements. This dynamic reflects the WTO solar panel conflict in which India’s attempts to safeguard its home industry collided with international trade policies to produce negative decisions giving market access top priority over local development.

In the end, even if the FTA guarantees export profits for some industries, it runs the danger of escalating already existing disparities by favouring capital-intensive, export-oriented companies over the great majority of Indian farmers, workers, and small enterprises. The lessons from RCEP and WTO conflicts imply that liberalisation can damage the very groups it purports to benefit in the absence of strong domestic protections.

Effects on climate justice and sustainability

With both parties promising to respect ambitious climate targets and support renewable energy cooperation, the sustainability portion of the India-UK FTA is positioned as a watershed for “green trade. “With clauses on renewable energy, circular economy, and biodiversity, the UK claims the treaty as guaranteeing the biggest environmental requirements India has ever agreed to in a trade agreement. These pledges are non-binding, though, and the pact does not assign various duties based on India’s developmental level.

The proposed Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) for the United Kingdom would be a crucial fault line since it taxes goods depending on their carbon footprint. Although pushed as a climate solution, such carbon taxes run the danger of being green protectionism, that is, of building new trade restrictions against Indian exports in areas including steel, aluminium, and chemicals. Long accepted in climate negotiations, this strategy ignores the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) concept, which says that developed countries should pay more for previous emissions and climate funding. Based on emission intensity, India’s own Carbon Credit Trading Scheme demonstrates the need to combine development with sustainability; yet, the text of the FTA does not ensure acceptance of this developmental necessity.

Environmental clauses devoid of a clear distinction between developed and developing nations run the danger of hiding severe economic disparities under the cover of environmental policy. Without clear protections, ESG criteria and carbon prices could turn from tools for allowing a fair transition for the Global South to tools for limiting market access and thereby supporting the Global North’s economic dominance. Therefore, absent differentiated responsibilities, sustainability clauses in the FTA could be more of tokens than tools of actual climate justice. 

Conclusion

The UK free trade agreements seen in third world or post-colonial lenses reflect less of a break from the past than new packages of older hierarchies in the form of neoliberalism. Although we promise mutual growth and strategic partnerships, small prints show enduring asymmetry. It demonstrates historically rooted imbalances, investor-friendly conflict mechanisms, weak safeguards for farmers and KMEs, environmental regulations with risks in environmentally friendly protectionism and climate justice measures. FTAs are far from offering flat arenas, increasing the global trade architecture in which the Global North continues to determine terms economically, technically and normatively. 

India’s defence strategies, such as the exclusion of delicate sectors, show maturity in negotiations, but rarely alter the structural disadvantages embedded in global trade. With limited participation in affected communities and inadequate safeguards for domestic interests, the agreement risks the capital-intensive sector, but alienates farmers, indigenous manufacturers and small businesses. 

In the meantime, the climate and digital chapters can fix Northern regulatory control, unless exchanged for principles of justice and differentiated responsibility. If free trade is truly fair trade, it needs to be reinterpreted from scratch. Trade policies should no longer be confined to technical elite regions. It must make sense to include civil society, farmers, working groups and interest groups on a small scale. The global South, including India, must encourage alternative economic framework conditions rooted in solidarity, technology exchange, reparative justice and mutual resistance. Only through such integrated and election-oriented approaches can FTAs ​​evolve from tools of neocolonial continuity to sustainable and common development.

Frequently Asked Questions

1. In India, who could be negatively affected by this agreement?

Local businesses, workers and small farmers can be negatively affected by this agreement as they may face competition from cheap UK imports.

2. Why is the ISDS clause controversial?

The ISDS allows foreign companies to sue the Indian government if they think their profits are harmed. This limits the Indian government from making its laws.  

3. Will FTA affect India’s digital and tech policies?

The UK wants easier data flow rules, which may challenge India’s efforts to keep data within the country and protect digital privacy.

References

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